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14. ABSTRACT Since the end of the Cold War, the face of conflict and the role of the U.S. military around the world have changed. Instead of focusing on a single adversary, the National Security Strategy directs engagement and shaping on a global level. Responding to situations across the spectrum of conflict, the U.S. military is working alongside U.S. and foreign government agencies, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) around the world in pursuit of U.S. interests. The sheer volume and complexity of work requires integration of all U.S. government agencies, and a standardized command and control organization to accomplish seamless planning and execution of national policy. Mere coordination is not enough. New legislation is needed to mandate the integration of U.S. government agencies within joint government operations similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986. This paper summarizes the common themes for improvement cited in existing literature on interagency coordination and outlines the proposed legislation as a long-range solution to interagency integration.					
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IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS, MERE COORDINATION IS NOT ENOUGH:
TOWARD JOINT GOVERNMENT

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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14 February 2005

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the face of conflict and the role of the U.S. military around the world have changed. Instead of focusing on a single adversary, the National Security Strategy directs engagement and shaping on a global level. Responding to situations across the spectrum of conflict, the U.S. military is working alongside U.S. and foreign government agencies, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) around the world in pursuit of U.S. interests. The sheer volume and complexity of work requires integration of all U.S. government agencies, and a standardized command and control organization to accomplish seamless planning and execution of national policy. Mere coordination is not enough. New legislation is needed to mandate the integration of U.S. government agencies within joint government operations similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act of 1986. This paper summarizes the common themes for improvement cited in existing literature on interagency coordination and outlines the proposed legislation as a long-range solution to interagency integration.

But the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms of action, as in the ultimate success of the whole. What we should admire is the accurate fulfillment of the unspoken assumptions, the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only becomes evident in the final success.

Karl von Clausewitz

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Introduction

As shown in the literature on the subject, unity of effort in interagency operations has not been achieved despite Presidential Directives, and much emphasis on coordination. The process has many obstacles, similar to those that existed in the coordination of military efforts prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reformation Act of 1986. What is needed is similar legislation, this time directing joint government operations. The legislation would create an operational level of civilian government, integrated with the military, with the ultimate aim of achieving U.S. national goals through unity of interagency efforts. That is not to say that all the military's problems have been resolved by Goldwater-Nichols, but a significant step toward unity of effort in the military was made by legislating "jointness." To limit the scope, this discussion covers only U.S. government agencies in international operations. Through joint government operations we will be better able to manage all the assets of the U.S. government, significantly improve the implementation of all instruments of national power, and achieve unity of effort through unity of command, standardization and education.

SECTION 1: THE FRAMEWORK

President Clinton, PDD-56

"Due to an under emphasis on civilian-related tasks, the civilian side of U.S. government intervention in the field is poorly managed, uncoordinated and underutilized," and as a result, direct military oversight in the field has often been necessary for success in U.S. interventions.¹ Former President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), published in 1997, was directed at this problem and mandated the improvement of the interagency process for Complex Contingency Operations (CCOs). Other Clinton PDDs

outlined improvements in peacekeeping operations, counter narcotics, drug trafficking, and counterterrorism, but little has been accomplished.

PDD-56 was designed to incorporate proven planning processes and implementation mechanisms into the interagency process, with the intent of achieving unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and International Organizations (IOs) engaged in CCOs. These practices would then identify appropriate missions and tasks, develop strategies, establish the basis for reconstruction, facilitate the planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation, integrate all components of a U.S. response at the policy level, facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level, identify issues for senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions.²

The mechanism to be used to implement PDD-56 in contingency operations was called the Executive Committee (ExComm). It was formed by the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council, was to be composed of representatives of all agencies involved and was supposed to oversee the development and implementation of a Political/Military (Pol/Mil) plan to guide coordination of all U.S. government agencies in theater. The content of the Pol/Mil plan is extremely similar to current military plans, with differences mainly in format. The guiding principle of the ExComm was to be personal accountability to the president, but the concept fell on deaf ears and has not been implemented.³

President Bush and NSPD-1

President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-1) in Feb 2001, which abolished the Interagency Working Groups and ExComms of PDD-56, and replaced them with National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC). It created six Regional NSC/PCCs and eleven Functional NSC/PCCs. Each of these PCCs is

led by a senior government official at the level of Under or Assistant Secretary. The PCCs are responsible for the “management of the development and implementation of national security policies.”⁴ This gives them oversight, but stops short of giving them the authority to direct action in the field.

PDD-56 and NSPD-1 were a good start, but they need to be inclusive of all interagency operations from nation building and peace operations all the way to major theater war, and provide the necessary authority and accountability to those in charge with a clearly delineated chain of command. To ensure joint government operations gets implemented, it has to be in the form of legislation, not just a PDD. Human nature being what it is, and without any accountability built in, even when the President directed interagency coordination, it didn’t happen.

SECTION 2: THE PROBLEMS

The interagency process is plagued by problems in many areas. The various agencies have conflicting organizational cultures, tend to view problems parochially, and often have insufficient funds and staff to execute their missions. Effective communication is stifled by stovepipes, security clearances and operational security. The agencies have no common ground for working together due to a lack of standard doctrine, multiple formats for strategic guidance, separate planning mechanisms and many variations on how to divide the globe into areas of responsibility. In addition, the internal processes of each agency are fundamentally different. Finally, the structure of interagency organizations lacks a chain of command, creating inefficiency and indecisiveness.

Narrow Vision: Organizational Cultures and Parochialism

The coordination problems among the various agencies of the federal government start with differences in their cultures. There are basic differences in how they operate and how they view other agencies. “Cultural differences among actors and the perceptions that they have of each other as well as operations which they conduct, complicate the coordination process.”⁵ In addition, disparate world views, political ideologies, and philosophies regarding the use of force are central reasons for interagency failure.⁶ Agencies typically view situations parochially rather than with an overall vision. Unfamiliarity with the other agencies involved, a lack of integrated planning, and turf wars contribute to parochialism.

Resource Limitations: Funding and Staffing

Currently the military is the only organization with the resources to conduct the ongoing deluge of engagement and intervention missions. The Department of State (DOS) has approximately 4000 Foreign Service Officers, only a single brigade equivalent, and is tasked with executing department business around the world.⁷ Funding for DOS, though recently increased, does not match their tasking.⁸ This dilemma is true in other areas of government as well. Even the current NSC/PCC system contains neither the expertise nor the staff to execute the Presidential policy decisions.⁹

No Common Doctrine, Equipment, Guidance or Plans

The recent development of joint military doctrine is a step in the right direction, but serves only the military. There is no joint government doctrine to govern the interactions of all agencies involved. As a result, much of the interagency process is ad hoc. Also, the equipment of U.S. government agencies is not standardized and may not be interoperable,

and interagency planning exists only as an afterthought to individual agency plans. Lastly, there is no single format for strategic guidance, which leaves room for each agency to interpret the intent.

Disorganized by Regions

There is no consistency in how the different agencies organize the world into regional areas to focus their efforts.¹⁰ There are five different combatant command Areas of Responsibility (AORs). The NSC/PCCs and DOS are divided into six regions, while the globe is split differently again for the military's theater security cooperation plans, the Army and Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) programs, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and others. It is difficult to achieve unity of effort when nobody is looking at the same space at the same time.

Restricted Information Flow: Stovepipes, Clearances, Operational Security (OPSEC) and Lessons Learned

Another shortcoming of the current interagency organization structures is restricted sharing of information between organizations. This includes "stovepipes," where information flows to and from the home agency to the representatives in the field, but does not move across to other organizations involved in the same effort. Other roadblocks to information sharing are clearances and OPSEC. Differing levels of clearances will cause some people to be denied access to crucial information. In addition, OPSEC has been cited in several crises as the reason why some critical agencies were left out of the loop in the planning process for fear of revealing the plan.¹¹ The final limitation on information flow is a lack of feedback mechanisms and a central lessons learned database for improving the performance of government agencies in the interagency process.

Relationships vs. Procedures

Many agencies run on relationships and personality, not procedures.¹² This is the antithesis to doctrine, and unfortunately one of the hallmarks of bureaucratic government. Without a standard organizational structure, and processes for reporting, discussion and feedback, strong personality can block effective communication, and some crucial ideas or functions may get neglected because they failed to receive the attention of the commander. The prestige of an organization or the personality of the individual is often the deciding factor in choosing a course of action.¹³

No Authority or Accountability: Organizational Structure

Current interagency organizational structures suffer from the lack of a unified chain of command. The chain of command is the element of organizational structure that supports authority and accountability, and demands leadership, all of which are necessary to achieve the greatest unity of effort. Instead, individual agencies use parallel chains of command, each accountable only to their parent agency, often keeping only their part of the overall effort in mind. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) was created in an attempt to reduce the effect of having no chain of command, but addresses the symptoms, not the cause. Without a unified chain of command to identify the single person in charge for all government functions, no one exists with the authority or responsibility to accomplish the task at hand, and so efforts are often inefficient or even divergent.¹⁴

SECTION 3: THE PROPOSED FIXES

The interagency process can be improved in all of these problem areas. The effect of differing cultures and parochialism can be mitigated by developing trust and confidence through education and personnel exchanges. Current resource levels must be adjusted

through Congress to make them commensurate with the missions assigned. Doctrine, equipment, security clearances, strategic guidance formats, regional areas of responsibility and the planning process must be standardized. Finally, and most importantly, the chain of command must be unified through the creation of an operational level of civilian government equivalent to the combatant commands, and the formation of interagency Joint Government Task Forces (JGTFs).

Educating: Interagency Service Officers

The first step toward better integration within the government is developing trust and confidence between participants in the interagency process, starting with education. In order to better execute U.S. national strategy around the globe, more detailed education needs to occur in the organization, operations and culture of all government agencies that interact in crisis response. This could be accomplished through more exchanges of officers and agency officials attending the service colleges or schools of the other government agencies.

Currently there is some education about the interagency process at the U.S. Naval War College, but that training is insufficient. What is necessary, is a series of capabilities briefs at the service colleges and U.S. government training schools covering the main interagency and non-government agency players: Defense, State, USAID, Treasury, Customs, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the United Nations (UN), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), InterAction, etc. Participation of members of these agencies could also be integrated into the existing interagency planning exercise.

In addition, similar to the career path for Acquisition Professionals, Joint Service Officers and FAOs, there should be a career path for Interagency Service Officers (ISOs). These officers would have trained with, been assigned to and be intimately familiar with the civilian government agencies that work so closely with the military in today's crisis operations.¹⁵ The same would be true of the civilians who come to military service colleges, are integrated into joint military exercises, and serve on military staffs. The familiarity, networks, trust and understanding that would result from the integrated team approach would be indispensable in the effective integration of all instruments of U.S. national power to achieve U.S. interests.

Appropriating: Appropriate for the Mission

The fix is complicated, and outside the scope of this paper, but no less necessary. The State Department recently received a significant funding increase, as it should be. Other government agencies should be evaluated in light of the new global security environment, and budgets and staffing adjusted accordingly. I suspect that the funds and staff of many civilian agencies like OFDA, USAID and Peace Corps would be greatly increased. Inversely, if as the efficiency of the system increases, and the civilian agencies reclaim from the military the lion's share of the activities for which the civilian agencies were designed, such as humanitarian assistance, the military would probably see a corresponding reduction in funds and personnel. Recent experience in Iraq highlighted how the military ignored some activities inherent in conflict, such as the humanitarian assistance and nation building required after the end of major combat. Many U.S. government agencies and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) were ready and willing to help, but had not been figured

into the plan.¹⁶ The key is to get the resources into the hands of the people tasked with the mission, and integrate the existing capabilities of all agencies to reduce duplication.

Standardizing: Doctrine, Guidance, Plans, Equipment and Clearances

Since Goldwater-Nichols, the military has achieved a good deal of unity of effort through standardization and all government agencies would be well served if the interagency process was governed by joint government doctrine. Having standard operating procedures, organizational structure, reporting formats, information pathways, and many other aspects of operating together would surely help the agencies interact more effectively.

Currently the military is developing joint doctrine for interagency coordination in military task forces, having just introduced JIACG as an addition to the new combatant commander's Standing Joint Force Headquarters.¹⁷ The JIACG is a good work around, since it standardizes interagency coordination and formally inserts it into a military Joint Task Force organizational structure. But, as pointed out before, it does not address the chain of command issue. In addition, other government agencies have no doctrine to outline their part of the effort and the JIACG achieves only coordination with a military task force, not integration of all parts of government.¹⁸

Another part of current joint doctrine governing the interagency process is the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). It is the coordination center for NGOs and IOs participating in a crisis alongside the military.¹⁹ Even when invited, many NGOs and IOs choose not to associate with government agencies for fear of losing the appearance of independent, altruistic action. For those NGOs and IOs that participate, the CMOC is crucial to coordination with both the military and non-military aspects of an operation. Since the

participation of NGOs and IOs cannot be mandated or led by the government, the CMOC should remain a part of future joint task forces.²⁰

Joint government doctrine would also outline common strategic guidance formats and planning systems for the interagency process. All agencies would start with the same guidance, in a recognized format, and would proceed to plan together with the same planning process and system.²¹ As it stands now, the military plan derived from the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), and the Pol-Mil plan directed by PDD-56 are nearly identical in their content.²² Despite PDD-56 which mandated integrated planning, plans are not integrated across agencies, duplicating effort and wasting resources.²³ JSPS produces many plans ranging from major theater wars down to crisis response plans, and all the military supporting plans to include personnel rotations and logistics. The regional combatant commanders and their staffs create Theater Security Cooperation Plans. The DOS also creates plans by region under the guidance of the Regional Bureaus (RBs), called Bureau Performance Plans, and by country under the guidance of the ambassador, called Mission Performance Plans. There is no integration of the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOS plans, the plans are for dissimilar regions, and interagency coordination is an afterthought. Joint Government means joint planning: it needs to become a formalized process and fully integrated.

Another result of Goldwater-Nichols was that the military services are required to coordinate their equipment purchases and ensure the compatibility of their systems. Other agencies that work with the military, however, have their own equipment, which isn't necessarily compatible. Radios, computers, databases, weapons, and a whole host of other

equipment need to be standardized so that all government agencies can work together more effectively in the field.²⁴

In addition, to facilitate the sharing of information between agencies, security clearances should be standardized. The clearance should be based on the mission you will be participating in, not just the organization you are in. That way, everyone in a particular task force would have the requisite clearance for the mission, and no agency would be excluded due to a lack of clearance. If you don't have the involvement of all the pertinent players from the beginning, then you don't have a worthwhile plan.

Reorganizing the Globe: Common Boundaries

The process of standardization should extend to the organization of the global AORs. The existing NSC/PCC AORs nearly match the DOS regions.²⁵ If these were used intact, significant changes would have to be made to the combatant command AORs. The appropriate standard map of the regions probably lies somewhere between the NSC/PCC arrangement and the combatant commands, but that is a topic for another paper. However you divide it up, if you can standardize the setup, you can grow regional expertise in each of the government agencies in each of the regions, so each regional expert would be talking about the same area, the same countries and the same problems, with a synergistic effect. Of course many problems span any arbitrary set of boundaries that is set up, so the necessity of inter-regional cooperation will still exist, but due to the immensity of the problem, it has to be broken down somehow.

Reorganizing the Force: Regional Bureaus and Joint Government Task Forces

This is the most critical of the suggested fixes to the interagency problem. Changing Department of State RBs into policy implementing organizations at the operational level for

the civilian side of government, combined with interagency JGTFs would address many of the problems identified above. It would establish a chain of command and provide the necessary authority and accountability to the single person in charge; facilitate joint planning and training within those task forces; standardize the regional organization of the U.S. government; foster the creation of joint government doctrine and common strategic guidance to govern those task forces; assist in the elimination of stovepipes, OPSEC issues and parochialism through constant interaction; and provide the framework for lessons learned. Retasking RBs and forming JGTFs however, would not address funding, staffing, interagency education, procurement of common equipment, or the issues with security clearances, each of which would have to be addressed separately in the legislation.

Regional Bureaus

As it stands now, “by default, unified commanders are the only officials who can provide leadership on behalf of the nation, even while operating in a supporting role to civilian agencies.”²⁶ The combatant commanders have been forced into the role of diplomat and integrator of U.S. interests in their AOR due to the absence of an equivalent civilian government official. The current DOS RBs should take on that role.


The Assistant Secretary of State for each region would become the Regional Bureau Chief (RBC), the civilian government “Commander” for that region.²⁷ The selection of an Assistant Secretary of State as the bureau chief only makes sense, as the organization already exists, the Department of State is the lead agency for foreign policy, and has expertise in three of the four instruments of national power: diplomacy, economics and information. The RBs would collocate with the regional combatant commands to facilitate a closer working relationship between all government agencies, the military, and the countries in their region.

The RBCs would be given the authority to implement policy at the operational level of civilian government, equivalent to the combatant commanders. To make this most effective, the ambassadors would be placed under the RBCs, but could retain a communication link to the President. The RBC and combatant commander would work hand in hand implementing policy, supporting each other through the JGTFs and country teams under their command, and collaborating on policy recommendations to be sent back to the PCCs in Washington.

Strong leadership, crisis analysis, planning and consistent working relationships are critical to fostering harmonious and effective interagency operations.²⁸ The combination of RBs, combatant commands and JGTFs would promote these. An established JGTF could be led either by the military or by a civilian agency, depending on the anticipated level of violence of the situation. For a crisis low in the spectrum, like presence, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance or a regional crisis, a civilian agency would be in control of the JGTF, under the RBC. For something with a higher level of violence, like counter drug, show of force, strikes or war, the military would be in command, under the regional combatant commander. The military forces or civilian government agency personnel needed in theater would deploy and be assigned to the JGTF for operational control.

The chain of command for any government or military unit assigned to a JGTF would shift to whoever was leading the JGTF, and run up through their chain of command. For instance, a civilian-led JGTF would have operational control of assigned military units. The chain of command for that military unit would run through the JGTF to the RBC, through the Secretary of State to the President. The parent organizations would retain administrative control for support, logistics and administration. The support relationships also need to be spelled out. For a military-led JGTF, the JGTF becomes the supported command, and the

RB becomes the supporting command; vice versa for a civilian-led JGTF. There exists the possibility of a military-led JGTF (with the RB in support) existing in the AOR at the same time as a civilian-led JGTF (with the combatant command in support). Figure 1 shows an example of a regional joint government organization.



Competent leadership of all employed forces and personnel in the field is a must. This should be assured through the careful screening of combatant commanders and RBCs, which already exists. The process of choosing leaders should proceed with an eye towards full competency in the application of all four instruments of national power. As it is, the

combatant commanders are using the diplomatic instrument with very little training and doing an excellent job, as are many ambassadors with the military instrument. Why not groom leaders knowledgeable in all four? Historically, not every Secretary of Defense has had military experience, or studied warfare and joint military operations in depth. Their qualification as a Secretary of Defense obviously lies elsewhere. Similarly, not every Secretary of State is a career diplomat. You could take someone who today would be a candidate for Secretary of Defense, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or Secretary of State, ensure they have sufficient expertise in the application of all four instruments of national power, and assign them as an RBC. The point is to create an operational “force” that inherently integrates all four components of national power, and to do so, one must consolidate those instruments under a unified chain of command.

Permanent Functional JGTFs

Leadership of the functional JGTFs would be given to the department or agency best suited, and placed under either a combatant commander or RBC. The counter-drug Joint Interagency Task Force, South (formerly JIATF-East) in Key West is one example of how the interagency puzzle can be put together within current constraints. JIATF-S has had some success in interagency coordination after many years of practice, but it still does not have the requisite authority and chain of command for the most efficient operations. The current JIATF retains only tactical control of participating units. Operational control of all units from the different participating agencies resides with their own agencies, not the JIATF or Commander, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). In addition, there is no operational RB equivalent to USSOUTHCOM in Miami.

JGTF-Counter Drug could be set up like a standard military Joint Task Force (JTF). There would be functional component commanders: land, maritime and air (Figure 2). The units from the various agencies (DEA helicopters, Border Patrol vehicle units, Coast Guard ships, etc) would be assigned to the JGTF commander for operational control, and the functional component commanders would retain tactical control. This should significantly improve unity of effort, centralize operations within each region, and retain a clear operational chain of command of all units involved. Joint operations will be new to the civilian units, as it was to the military prior to Goldwater-Nichols. They will have to accept switching operational control from their parent agency to a JGTF.

PERMANENT FUNCTIONAL JGTF




Figure 2

Temporary Functional JGTFs

While the counter drug task force would be a permanent functional task force, other functional areas, such as disaster relief, or foreign humanitarian assistance, would be situation dependent (Figure 3). They would only come into being when needed, from shells set up in the regional organizations. The forces, agencies and personnel likely to be involved would receive training in their parent agencies, and would participate in joint exercises, but would not be assigned to the joint task force until the need arose. They might not even be in theater. When called upon, they would be assigned to the newly stood-up functional JGTF for operational control. The command relationship would be delineated in the pre-existing JGTF structure, with a lead agency and commander identified. The JGTF commander could be either supported by, or provide support to the ambassador and country team, or even to the RBC and regional team for a more widespread disaster. This way all necessary units would know that they are on standby to do the mission, and would be training to execute it when called upon.

These functional JGTFs would work at the operational level like any joint command. The units would be organized functionally, perhaps making logistics, medical, construction and security sections. Whichever agency had the appropriate expertise would be put in charge of the appropriate section. The JGTF commander would have operational control of assigned forces, and the section chiefs would have tactical control. In order to eliminate the stigma of military forces associated with relief efforts, the functions could be broken down further in order to keep the military presence separate from NGOs that might be sensitive to their presence. You could have the military only involved in getting supplies to the relief stations, and OFDA in charge of distributing it alongside the NGOs.

TEMPORARY FUNCTIONAL JGTF




Figure 3

Effects of Implementing JGTFs

Within a JGTF, information must be shared. Stovepipes would disappear, and OPSEC would be much less of a concern. Instead, assigned interagency personnel owe their allegiance, and information, to the JTF commander. Reports, feedback, discussion and suggestions on the task at hand, the normal give and take of a good organization, would be centered on the JGTF staff. This would contribute to the unity of effort, while still allowing all members to continue to keep their parent agency informed.

Authority and accountability are critical to the JGTF. The JGTF commander needs to have the authority to act in his AOR, on his best judgment, using all the assets available to him. This has not been the case where coordination has been the rule. For instance, U.S.

Customs officials participated in sanctions against Bosnia, but did not participate in either Iraq or Serbia.²⁹ The JGTF personnel and assets would be under the operational control of the JGTF commanders, who would have the authority to execute all aspects of the mission in their AOR or functional area, and integrated staffs to support them. As a corollary to that authority, the JGTF commander would also be held accountable, through the chain of command, for the performance of the task force. Currently, the setup for a state's emergency response has the necessary chain of command, with the governor in charge of all state assets involved. The JGTF would implement this concept at the operational level.

JGTFs would have certain things inherent. Standard guidance and doctrine should come into being as a by-product of their existence. Joint planning and training should exist merely through the functioning of the task force. Lessons learned should flow back through the organization to the leadership. These developments can be helped to fruition by their inclusion in the joint government legislation.

SECTION 4: THE LEGISLATION

Joint government legislation should be written to accomplish several things. First, create the organizational structure of joint government through RBs, and permanent and standby functional JGTFs, complete with the chain of command and support relationships. Second, standardize regional organization to provide continuity, and collocate the RBs with the combatant commands. Third, mandate standardized joint government doctrine, equipment, strategic guidance format, planning, training, exercises, equipment and clearances. Fourth, create an additional qualification designator for ISO, increase the emphasis on FAOs, and require both to receive interagency education. Last, fund a study of the appropriate mission, manning levels and funding for all agencies.

What will emerge is an operational level of joint government where there previously had been none. In the RBCs, the combatant commanders will have a civilian equivalent. Interagency JGTFs under their command will execute national policy. Both will have a stake in the success of these JGTFs through the supporting relationships, making interagency operations more efficient through joint government operations. Like Joint Vision 2020 points out, the best decisions in any operation result “from information superiority, organizational and doctrinal adaptation, relevant training and experience, and the proper command and control mechanisms across the spectrum of interagency effort, from war to peacetime operations.”³⁰

Notes

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- ¹ David W. Bowker, "The New Management of Peace Operations under PDD-56," Fletcher Forum of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 22:2 (Summer/Fall 1998): 59.
- ² The White House, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive May 1997. (Washington, DC: May 1997). <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>/ January 12, 2005.
- ³ Rowan Scarbrough, "Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions," The Washington Times, 6 December 1999, sec A, 1.
- ⁴ The White House, National Security Presidential Directive One (NSPD-1). (Washington, DC: February 13, 2001). <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/whitehouse/nspd-1.htm>/ January 20, 2005.
- ⁵ John H. Eisenhower and Edward Marks, "Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-Military Operations," Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1999): 86.
- ⁶ Vicki J. Rast, "Interagency Conflict and U.S. Intervention Policy: Toward a Bureaucratic Model of Conflict Termination," (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA: 1999), 615.
- ⁷ Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward into the 21st Century," Organizing for National Security (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2000), 184.
- ⁸ Joe Manning and Dave Mackey, "The Interagency Process and Haiti: A Case Study," Advanced Course, National Security and the Interagency Process (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1998), 4.
- ⁹ William Mendel and David Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations (National Defense University, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1995), 14.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 8.
- ¹¹ Margaret Daly Hays and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti – a Case Study (National Defense University, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, February 1996). <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201996/Interagency%20and%20Pol-Mil%20Dim%20of%20Peace%20Ops%20-%20Haiti%20-%20Feb%201996/ch5.html> December 19, 2004.

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- ¹² Scott Moore, “Gold, Not Purple: Lessons from USAID-USMILGP Cooperation in El Salvador, 1980-1992,” (Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: 1997), 36.
- ¹³ Rast, 580.
- ¹⁴ Paul David Miller, The Interagency Process (Cambridge, MA: Tufts University, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), 19.
- ¹⁵ Moore, 92.
- ¹⁶ James K. Bishop, “Combat Role Strains Relations between America’s Military and its NGOs,” Humanitarian Affairs Review (Summer 2003): 29.
- ¹⁷ Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group, Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 6 (Suffolk, VA: 27 June 2004), 3.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 7.
- ¹⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, Joint Pub 3-57 (Washington, DC: 8 February 2001), IV-11.
- ²⁰ Eisenhower, 90.
- ²¹ Edward J. Filiberti, “National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?” Parameters, (Autumn 1995): <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/1995/filibert.htm> January 5, 2005.
- ²² The White House, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive May 1997 (Washington, DC: May 1997). <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm> January 12, 2005.
- ²³ Mendel, 8.
- ²⁴ Miller, 24.
- ²⁵ U.S. Department of State Website. <http://www.state.gov/> February 7, 2005.
- ²⁶ William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, “Interagency Cooperation: PDD-56 and Complex Contingency Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Spring 2000): 94.
- ²⁷ The White House, NSPD-1.
- ²⁸ Rast, 611.

²⁹ Jennifer M. Taw, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other than Warfare: Implications for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, Arroyo Center, 1997), 8.

³⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington DC: June 2000), 8.

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